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REDEFINING "WILLFUL" IN THE LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES PROVISION OF THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
I. INTRODUCON
With better medical care and greater appreciation for healthy lifes-
tyles and habits, Americans are living longer in 1990 than they were in
1967 when the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' became
law. As the percentage of older Americans increases and as life length-
ens, it is not surprising that older Americans want to work later into
their lives. As a result, the ADEA is one of the most litigated federal
employment statutes, with constantly evolving case law.
In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,2 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the ADEA's controversial liquidated damages provision for
the first time. Before Thurston, there were several different standards
under which a "willful" violation, triggering the liquidated damages
provision, was evaluated. The Court's decision brought some clarity to
the issue, but application problems surfaced. Other strands of analysis
developed as courts of appeals attempted to apply the Court's decision.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has formulated a standard which
holds to the legislative intent announced by the Court, but which re-
solves the ambiguities that arise from application of Thurston's standard
to varied fact patterns.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)3 to promote employment of older persons, to prohibit arbi-
trary discrimination against them and to help employers and workers
meet problems arising from the impact of age on employment. 4 Ini-
tially, the ADEA covered employees and applicants for employment be-
tween the ages of forty and sixty-five and private employers of twenty or
more workers. Amendments to the ADEA have gradually broadened the
class of protected persons and the class of affected employers to include
the following persons: government workers (1974); 5 persons up to age
seventy (1978);6 workers in covered employers' workplaces in foreign
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
4. Id. § 621(b).
5. Id. § 633a.
6. Id. § 631.
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countries (1984); 7 and in 1986, all persons over the age of forty.8 In
addition, the ADEA applies to employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions. 9 Approximately twenty-one percent of the workers in the United
States' labor force are between the ages of forty and seventy.' 0 Increas-
ingly, these older workers are seeking the Act's protection. "
Enacted in 1967, the ADEA draws its substantive provisions from an-
other 1960's anti-discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII). 12 The ADEA's remedies, however, are drawn mostly
from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1935 (FLSA).' 3 As a result, the
ADEA has been called a hybrid of the two statutes.
14
The integration of Title VII and FLSA ideas into one statute has
resulted in much speculation as courts and commentators have at-
tempted to determine the intent underlying certain ADEA provisions.
There are important differences between the ADEA and the FLSA that
may be the cause of the confusion regarding congressional intent. For
example, the FLSA provides for an automatic doubling of damages for a
violation, 15 and criminal penalties for a "willful" violation, 16 while the
ADEA provides for doubling of damages only where a "willful" violation
is found, creating two tiers of civil liability.'
7
7. Id. § 623(f(1).
8. Id. § 631 (a). The ceiling age was thus removed from the ADEA. For more discus-
sion of the ADEA's historical background, see A. RuzicHO, L. JACOBS & L. THRASHER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.01 (1989).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c) (1988).
10. Keaton & Larson, Age Discrimination in Employment: Case Law and Implications for Em-
ployers, 40 LAB. L.J. 575, 576 (1989).
11. "In 1979, approximately 5,000 cases were filed. By 1983, the number had grown
to over 19,000. During the 1980s, each year on average has seen a 17 percent increase in
cases filed .... Sixty-seven percent of the cases filed are discharge cases." Id. at 580
(footnotes omitted). A recent article cited "[c]orporate reductions, mergers and a height-
ened public awareness of the elderly" as factors contributing to the increase in age dis-
crimination lawsuits. Schweit, Changing Times Lead to Proliferation of Age Bias Lawsuits,
Chicago Daily L. Bull., Dec. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 121 (1985). For a discussion of the relationship between the ADEA and Title
VII, see Recent Developments, Bootstrapping a Malice Requirement Into ADEA Liquidated Dam-
age Awards-Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 62 WASH. L. REV. 551, 552 (1987) [hereinafter Recent
Developments]; Wallach & Marx, Damages for Age Discrimination: Courts Split on 'Willfulness'
Rule, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 18, col. 1.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988); Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 552-53;
Wallach & Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 1.
14. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 485 (2d ed. 1983).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
16. Id. § 216(a).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
Commentators have summarized the differences between the FLSA and the ADEA as
follows:
There are three notable exceptions to the incorporation of the FLSA's remedial
provisions into the ADEA: a. The ADEA does not incorporate the criminal pen-
alties available in the FLSA; b. The ADEA provides for liquidated damages only
in the case of "willful" violations; and c. The ADEA grants courts broad discre-
tionary power by authorizing the court to award "such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this [Act.]" § 626(b).
Panken, Levitt & Cardinal, New Issues in Age Discrimination, 13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATER-
IALS J. 49, 74-75 (1989). For a thorough treatment of congressional reasoning in the
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The issues created by the integration of two laws into the ADEA are
even further complicated by a fourth statute, the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 (PPA),' 8 which is incorporated into both the FLSA and the ADEA.
Section 6 of the PPA extends the statute of limitations from two years to
three if a "willful" violation is found.' 9 This section of the PPA was
enacted in 1966 to apply to the FLSA. It was incorporated into the
ADEA upon that statute's enactment.20 Another section of the PPA,
section 11, is incorporated into the FLSA but not into the ADEA, at least
not expressly. 2 1 This section was enacted to soften the harshness of the
FLSA's automatic doubling of damages, 2 2 and provides that the court
may elect not to award liquidated damages if the employer shows a good
faith belief that it did not violate the FLSA.2 3 Given the confusing inte-
gration of laws that were combined to form the ADEA, it is not surpris-
ing that congressional intent regarding the Act is difficult to determine.
B. Damages Under the ADEA
As previously stated, the ADEA's damages provision consists of a
two-tier liability scheme. 24 A basic finding of liability results in an award
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. 25 If the
employer is found to have committed a "willful" violation of the ADEA,
the employee will receive liquidated damages consisting of an amount
equal to the backpay award.2 6 Application of the liquidated damages
provision has been difficult, however, because Congress failed to include
a definition of the word "willful" in the ADEA.
2 7
Since there is no statutory language expressly defining "willful,"
courts have had to resort to legislative history to determine congres-
sional intent. Courts and commentators frequently focus on whether
the ADEA's liquidated damages provision was enacted to provide com-
pensatory or punitive relief.2 8 In Thurston, the Supreme Court consid-
ADEA's development, see Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 552-54. See also infra
notes 31-33 (comparison of FLSA's criminal and ADEA's civil penalties for willful
violations).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1988).
19. Id. § 255(a).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (1988).
21. The Fifth Circuit has held that "section 11 of the PPA applies to violations under
the ADEA." Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976). The
Supreme Court, while not agreeing that the section is incorporated into the ADEA, has
stated that "the same concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA
[§ 626(b)]." Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22 (1985). See infra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text and notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text.
22. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
24. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
26. Id.; Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination and Employment
Act, 45 MD. L. REv. 298, 320 (1986).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Marion, supra note 26, at 321; Note, Willfulness, Good Faith, and the Quagmire
of Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 J. CORP. L. 573, 583-
86 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Willfulness]; Comment, Employment Discrimination-The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act Permits Recovery of Liquidated Damages Only Upon Showing of Em-
1991]
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ered, for the first time, "what constitutes a 'willful' violation of the
ADEA, entitling a plaintiff to 'liquidated' or double damages." 29 In
Thurston, the Court declared that Congress intended liquidated damages
under the ADEA to be punitive in nature. 30 The Court highlighted Sen-
ator Javits' 3 remarks recommending that a double damage liability
scheme be substituted for the administration's suggested incorporation
of the FLSA's criminal penalty for willful violations. The Senator noted
that a criminal provision would create difficult problems of proof and
that employers' invocation of the fifth amendment might frustrate im-
plementation of the Act.32 On this basis, criminal penalties were re-
jected. Instead, a basic finding of liability for a violation of the ADEA
results in a compensatory damage award, while a willful violation results
in a liquidated damages award which is punitive in nature.
35
III. "WILLFULNESS" STANDARDS PRIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT'S
THURSTON DECISION
Prior to Thurston, the various circuit courts of appeals engaged in
different approaches in defining "willfulness." Since the FLSA was in-
corporated into the ADEA, courts sometimes used FLSA decisions in
developing their ADEA "willfulness" standards. The circuit courts of
appeals borrowed extensively from one another in developing their
standards. While relying on other circuits' approaches, each court re-
stated the standard in its own words. Because Thurston's "willfulness"
standard was incapable of uniform application in all ADEA cases, courts
of appeals retained variations of many of these pre-Thurston standards
long after Thurston was decided.
ployer's Outrageous Conduct in Violating the Act: Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 32 VILL. L. REV. 855,
866-67 (1987)[hereinafter Comment, Employment Discrimination]; Survey, 1985-1986 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C.L. REV. 119, 223 (1986).
29. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 114. Thurston is examined infra notes 75-92 and accompany-
ing text.
30. Id. at 125.
31. Id. SenatorJavits was a cosponsor of the amendment which provided for enforce-
ment and remedies under the FLSA. The other sponsor was Senator Yarborough. Hays v.
Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976)(citing 113 CONG. REC. 31254
(1967)).
32. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 2199, 7076 (1967)).
33. One commentator maintains that debate over whether the Act's liquidated dam-
ages provision was intended to be compensatory or punitive arises from semantic confu-
sion in the law in which "punitive" and "compensatory" have both been used to refer to
damages for pain and suffering. Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 583-84. Any such con-
fusion regarding the ADEA should be resolved, however, by the Supreme Court's finding
in Thurston, and the fact that damages for pain and suffering are unavailable under the
ADEA. Marion, supra note 26, at 323; Comment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28,
at 858 n.12.
Note, however, that this does not mean that the employee is barred from seeking
damages for pain and suffering. For example, in Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150
(10th Cir. 1990), the employee asserted a pendent state claim for age discrimination and
extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 1152. Although the state claim was unsuccessful,
the case illustrates that a state claim for emotional distress may be adjudicated in the same
proceeding as an ADEA federal claim.
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A. Pre-Thurston "Willfulness" Standards in Other Circuits
The most liberal interpretation of "willfulness" by a circuit court of
appeals was the "in the picture" standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc.,34 an FLSA statute of limitations case.
Stated most simply, the standard asked, "Did the employer know the
FLSA was in the picture?" 35 If answered in the affirmative, a "willful"
violation of the FLSA had occurred. The "in the picture" standard was
subsequently applied by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits to the ADEA's liq-
uidated damages provision.3 6 The Supreme Court overturned Jiy June
in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. 
3 7
The Fifth Circuit introduced another component of the FLSA into
ADEA jurisprudence when it found that the good faith provision of the
34. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). The Fifth Circuit
specifically addressed "whether a violation [of the FLSA] committed in good faith may yet
be wilful .. " Id. at 1141.
35. Id. The employer in the case had consulted with his attorney prior to entering
into a collective bargaining agreement which purported to exempt his employees from the
FLSA overtime rate. His attorney advised him that his employees would be exempt under
the FLSA.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's "wilful" violation finding, reasoning that
the employer's decision to request advice of counsel showed that he was aware that the
FLSA might prevent the change in overtime pay. Id. at 1140-41. The court stated that the
legislative history of the 1966 FLSA amendments indicated Congress' liberalizing intent,
and the court decided that "[riequiring employers to have more than awareness of the
possible applicability of the FLSA would be inconsistent with that intent." Id. at 1142.
Thus, "the employer's decision to change his employees' rate of pay in violation of [the]
FLSA is 'wilful' when .. .there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA." Id.
36. Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980) (ADEA liquidated dam-
ages); EEOC v. Central Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983) (ADEA stat-
ute of limitations): EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir.
1984) (ADEA liquidated damages) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in
light of Thurston, see infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text), vacated, 469 U.S. 1145
(1985) ; Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1981) (ADEA liquidated dam-
ages). The Fifth Circuit citedJiffy June in a 1974 FLSA case and articulated the "willful-
ness" standard as follows: "An employer acts willfully and subjects himself to the three
year liability provision if he knows, or has reason to know, that his conduct is governed by
the Fair Labor Standards Act." Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
in original). The Heard standard was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Spagnuolo v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1981) (ADEA liquidated damages), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 860 (1982).
37. 486 U.S. 128 (1988). Richland Shoe was an FLSA case in which the Court deter-
mined that Jiffy June's "in the picture" standard "virtually obliterates any distinction be-
tween willful and nonwillful violations" and thus rejected its use in the FLSA statute of
limitations context. Id. at 132-34. In Thurston, the Court had determined that the "in the
picture" standard should not be used in the ADEA liquidated damages context. Thurston,
469 U.S. at 127-28.
Courts have struggled with the question of whether the same definition of "willful"
should be applied to the FLSA and the ADEA statute of limitations provisions as well as to
the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. Even in Thurston, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the circuit courts of appeals are divided over this question, but the Court
failed to provide an answer. Id. at 128 n.21.
In Richland Shoe, however, the Court held that the standard applied in Thurston to de-
fine a "willful" violation for purposes of ADEA liquidated damages should also be used to
determine whether a "willful" violation of the FLSA's statute of limitations provision has
occurred. Richland Shoe, 486 U.S. at 135. Apparently, then, the definition of "willful" is
the same in both contexts.
4891991]
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PPA3 8 should be applied to the ADEA as well.3 9 Section 11 of the PPA
grants a court the discretionary power to award no liquidated damages
when the employer shows a good faith belief that it has not violated the
statute.40 In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,41 the Fifth Circuit noted that the
trial judge had recognized that the defendant satisfied section 11 of the
PPA and the judge would not award liquidated damages if that section
applied in an ADEA context.42 Relying on Jiffy June, however, the trial
court found a "willful violation." '43 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ex-
amined legislative history and reversed the "willful" finding after deter-
mining that section 11 of the PPA does apply to violations of the
ADEA.
44
The most stringent definition of "willful" adopted by any of the cir-
cuit courts of appeals was that adopted by the First Circuit in what has
come to be known as the "specific intent" standard. The First Circuit
defined "willfully" as "voluntarily and intentionally, and with the spe-
cific intent to do something the law forbids .... -45 This standard has
not received much of a following.
4 6
The standard ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Thurston
was an employer's "knowing or showing a reckless disregard" for
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. 4 7 This standard dates
back as far as 1951, when the Tenth Circuit applied it in an FLSA case to
determine whether the employer should be subject to criminal penal-
ties. 48 The standard was applied by the Third Circuit in 1980, 49 by the
Second Circuit in 198150 and again in 1983 in Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,51 which was the case on appeal in Thurston.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988), also known as section 11 of the PPA. See supra notes 18-23
and accompanying text for a discussion of the PPA.
39. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
41. Hays, 531 F.2d at 1312.
42. Id. at 1309.
43. Id. at 1309-10.
44. Id. at 1312. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text for discussion of the
relationship between the ADEA and the PPA. The Supreme Court has approved incorpo-
rating the concerns of section 11 into the ADEA, even though it has refused to fully incor-
porate section 11 into the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22 (1985). See infra notes 82 & 83 and
accompanying text.
45. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979) (quoting DEvIr &
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, sec. 14.06, at 384 (3d. ed. 1977)).
46. See Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 589-90; Note, Liquidated Damages and Statute of
Limitations Under the "Willful" Standard of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Repercussions of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 516,
533 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Liquidated Damages]; infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
47. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126.
48. Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
876 (1951). The standard was similarly applied in Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1943).
49. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980) (in dictum). See Note,
Liquidated Damages, supra note 46, at 536.
50. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1981).
51. 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983), rev d in part, sub nom., Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
490 [Vol. 68:4
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In Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) had
changed its collectively-bargained-for mandatory retirement policy in
response to concern that the 1978 amendments to the ADEA made the
policy unlawful. The change resulted in two lawsuits against TWA, one
by the Air Line Pilots Association, the other by plaintiff-employee Har-
old Thurston and two other TWA employees. The two suits were con-
solidated on appeal. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden of showing TWA
violated the ADEA. Applying the "knowing or reckless disregard" stan-
dard, the Second Circuit held that TWA willfully violated the ADEA.
5 2
TWA filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Second Circuit's hold-
ing, and the Union filed a cross petition on the liability issue. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated both cases.
53
B. The Tenth Circuit's Pre- Thurston "Willfulness" Standards
The Tenth Circuit's experience with the ADEA liquidated damages
provision prior to 1985 was similar to that of other circuit courts of ap-
peals. In an early ADEA case, the Tenth Circuit applied the Fifth Cir-
cuit's "in the picture" standard. 54 Later, the Tenth Circuit gradually
borrowed from other circuits until it developed a standard that it used
consistently.5 5 Finally, it learned, along with many other circuit courts
of appeals, that this standard did not conform with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the ADEA's legislative intent.
5 6
Mistretta v. Sandia Corp. 5 7 was an ADEA case involving a work force
reduction at Sandia. Sandia had "review committees" that struggled
with the adverse impact of this reduction on the older employees, but
the Company disregarded this impact when it was brought to its atten-
tion. 58 In upholding the trial court's "willfulness" finding, the Tenth
Circuit applied the Fifth Circuit's Jify June "in the picture" standard.
59
The court also looked at the Fifth Circuit's Hays holding that the em-
ployer's good faith could be a defense to a "willfulness" finding.60 The
court noted, however, that the ADEA does not mention section 11 of the
PPA, and since Sandia's behavior made the question moot, the court did
not need to decide whether Congress intended such "double statutory
incorporation." 
6
Next the Tenth Circuit construed "willfulness" for purposes of the
statute of limitations provision in an FLSA case, EEOC v. Central Kansas
52. Id. at 956-57. See Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 594-95.
53. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 120. Thurston is discussed infra at notes 75-92 and accompa-
nying text.
54. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 73 and accompanying text and notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
57. 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 595.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. & n.4.
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Medical Center.6 2 The trial court found that the Medical Center had paid
male janitors more than women housekeepers for substantially equal
work, and that the pay differential was not justified by a factor other than
gender. 6 3 In addition, the trial court found that the FLSA violation was
"willful," 6 4 thus lengthening the statute of limitations by one year. On
appeal, the Medical Center argued that "willfulness" should be deter-
mined according to a "deliberate, voluntary, and intentional" stan-
dard.6 5 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding a violation to be "willful"
when "the employer was, or should have been, cognizant of an apprecia-
ble possibility that the employees involved were covered by the statutory
provisions."
66
In EEOC v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, (Prudential
1 ),67 the Tenth Circuit construed "willful" for purposes of the liqui-
dated damages provision of the ADEA. The EEOC contended that Pru-
dential had discharged six employees and demoted a seventh in
violation of the ADEA. 68 In its instruction to the jury regarding a "will-
ful" violation, the trial court used a specific intent standard: "A willful
violation occurs when a person acts with specific intent to violate the
law, where with knowledge of the law he proceeds, or it proceeds to
violate the law knowingly and intentionally."'6 9 On appeal, the EEOC
contended that the jury instruction imposed too strict a standard. 70 The
Tenth Circuit agreed. Applying the Central Kansas standard, the court
concluded that Prudential's violation was "willful" as a matter of law.
7 1
In addition, the Tenth Circuit stated that section 11 of the PPA, the
"good faith" defense, was not incorporated into the ADEA. 72 The
Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded it
73
for further consideration in light of Thurston.
62. 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 1273.
64. Id. at 1274.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1981)). Marshall was the first Ninth Circuit opinion to adopt a "willful" standard for
purposes of the FLSA statute of limitations. Id. at 1091. The Ninth Circuit looked to the
District of Columbia and the Fifth Circuits (Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Brennan v. Heard, 491
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) and Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972)) in developing its standard. Marshall, 650
F.2d at 1091-93.
67. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985). The
remanded case was taken up in EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) (Prudential 2). For discussion of Prudential 2,
see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
68. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d at 1227.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1234. It is interesting to note that in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Supreme Court specifically rejected both the specific intent and
the "in the picture" standards. Id. at 126 n.19, 128 n.22. See infra notes 84-90 and accom-
panying text.
72. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d at 1234.
73. 469 U.S. 1154 (1985).
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IV. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. V. THURSTON: ATrEMPTING TO
CLARIFY DEBATE AMONG THE CIRCUITS
7 4
In Thurston,7 5 the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
finding that TWA had violated the ADEA, but reversed its finding that
the violation was "willful."' 76 While the Court approved of the Second
Circuit's "reckless disregard" definition of "willful," it disapproved of
the way in which the court applied this definition.
7 7
In finding the "reckless disregard" definition "reasonable, '7 8 the
Court examined the ADEA's legislative history. Finding that Congress
was aware ofjudicial interpretations of the FLSA when the ADEA was
enacted, the Court reasoned that interpretations of the FLSA's criminal
penalty provision for "willful" violations were relevant in determining
the definition of "willful" under the ADEA. 79 The Court cited the
Tenth and Fifth Circuits, and noted that the standard used by those
courts was "substantially in accord with the interpretation of 'willful'
adopted by the [Second Circuit] Court of Appeals in interpreting the
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA." 80 The Court also found
the Second Circuit's "reckless disregard" interpretation of "willful"
consistent with its own definition of "willful" in other criminal and civil
statutes. 8 1 In addition, the Court stated that the concerns embodied in
section 11 of the PPA, 82 which provides an employer with a "good faith"
defense, were similarly reflected in the ADEA, even though that section
is not expressly incorporated into the ADEA.
83
While the Thurston Court forged its own "willfulness" standard,
combining "reckless disregard" with the "good faith" defense, it specifi-
cally rejected two of the pre-Thurston definitions of "willfulness." The
Court most obviously rejected the "in the picture" standard, noting that
this standard would frustrate Congress' two-tier liability scheme when
applied to the ADEA.8 4 The Court noted that because employers are
required by the ADEA to post notices "prepared or approved by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter," 85 the "in the picture" standard would result in an
automatic double damage award in almost every case,8 6 even when the
employer had acted reasonably and in good faith.
8 7
74. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 130.
77. "Although we hold that this is an acceptable way to articulate a definition of 'will-
ful,' the court below misapplied this standard." Id. at 128-29.
78. Id. at 126.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 876 (1951); Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1943)).
81. Id.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
83. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22.
84. Id. at 128.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1988).
86. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
87. Id. n.22.
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The "specific intent" standard also met with the Court's disfavor in
Thurston.88 TWA argued for this standard despite the fact that the stan-
dard had not gathered much of a following before Thurston.89 In re-
sponse, the Court stated simply, "[w]e do not agree with TWA's
argument," and noted that other courts have found a "willful" violation
absent an evil motive or bad purpose on the employer's part. 90
The Court's resort to interpretations of "willful" in FLSA cases
makes little sense since the ADEA does not include the FLSA's criminal
sanctions for "willful" violations. 9 ' In addition, the Court was not as
helpful as it might have been in Thurston; it noted that the circuit courts
of appeals were divided over whether the "willfulness" standard should
be identical for liquidated damages and the statute of limitations period,
but it failed to resolve the debate.9 2 As a result, the lower courts had to
wait three years to learn that the standard is the same for the two
provisions.
93
IV. POST-THuRSTON "WILLFULNESS" STANDARDS
A. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals
The initial reaction to Thurston was optimistic,94 but the standard
announced therein to define "willful" violations for purposes of liqui-
dated damages has not been readily applicable in all ADEA cases. 95 Age
discrimination can be broken down into two broad categories--dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment. The circuit courts of appeals en-
countered a problem after Thurston when attempting to apply that case
to cases where disparate treatment was at issue.
88. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "specific in-
tent" standard.
89. See, e.g., Wallach & Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 2 stating "several courts have
considered employers' arguments that a willful violation required a showing of bad faith,
evil motive or malevolence on the employer's part. Prior to Thurston, the courts of appeals
uniformly rejected this approach." (citing Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3d.
Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1981); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
90. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126 n.19, (citing Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d
478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951)). The Thurston Court is referring. here to
criminal liability for "willful" violations of the FLSA.
91. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text and notes 31-33 and accompanying
text (comparing the FLSA's criminal and the ADEA's civil penalties for "willful"
violations).
92. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.21.
93. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988).
94. "It is a standard that courts will easily be able to apply to 'willful' violations of the
ADEA; the result will be the award of equitable and reasonable damages to injured plain-
tiffs." Note, Defining Willfulness Under the ADEA: Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 69 MARQ. L.
REV. 451, 461 (1986).
95. "Although the Supreme Court intended Thurston to clarify the muddy issue of
what constitutes willful conduct under the ADEA, the ruling has not had the desired effect.
The decision instead has spawned divergent results in almost every circuit .... " Wallach
& Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 3; "Since the Supreme Court's decision in Thurston, lower
courts have continued to grapple with establishing a definition of willful that satisfies the
objectives of Thurston when applied to differing fact patterns." Note, Willfulness, supra note
28, at 576. See also Comment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28, at 864 n.35 (quoting
an Alabama district court's frustration with the Thurston standard).
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The terms "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" arise from
concepts of discrimination developed under Title VII. 9 6 Disparate im-
pact occurs when an employment policy, plan, rule or procedure "ad-
versely affects employment opportunities of a defined protected class
when compared to the effect that device has upon the opportunities of
other classes."'9 7 Disparate treatment, on the other hand, can be sys-
temic or individual 98 and involves "discrete employment decision[s] di-
rected at an individual." 99 In disparate treatment cases, proof of an
employer's motivation is required. Direct evidence is sometimes avail-
able to assist a plaintiff's case, but more often the cases must be proven
by "inferences from objective factors."' 0 0
ADEA discharge cases have adopted a proof model from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,10 ' a Title VII case. As adapted to ADEA cases, the
model requires that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case by showing
that he or she (1) is in the protected age group, (2) was qualified for the
position or satisfactorily performing up to his or her termination, (3)
was terminated, and (4) the defendant sought applicants to fill the posi-
tion, or younger persons were retained in positions similar to the plain-
tiff's. 10 2 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the employer, and the employee will pre-
vail unless the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the action.10 3 If the employer articulates such a reason, the
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the prof-
fered reason is merely a pretext. The plaintiff can prove that the reason
is pretextual in two ways: "directly by presenting evidence indicating
that age more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly by presenting
evidence that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence."1
04
It is important to note that Thurston was a case involving company
policy which affected employees as a group. As a result, subsequent
courts have categorized it as a disparate impact case.10 5 Several courts
96. Sullivan & Zimmer, Proving a Violation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 808 (1987).
97. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 356 (1988).
98. Id. at 809. For ease of discussion, this Note will refer only to the broad categories
of "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment."
99. Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 530.
101. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
102. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 530-31. This proof scheme is essentially the same in
age discrimination cases in which the adverse action is not termination, but is, for example,
failure to hire, promote or transfer.
103. Id. at 531. While the burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion re-
mains with the plaintiff throughout. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Co., 863 F.2d 1544, 1547
(10th Cir. 1988).
104. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 532-33. Courts have interpreted the former method
of proof to mean that "age was more likely than not a determinativefactor in the employment
decision." Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989). The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that courts have referred to Thurston as a disparate impact
case, but noted that it could be categorized as a disparate treatment case since TWA's
policy was not facially neutral. Id. Regardless of which label is attached to the case,
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have discovered that when Thurston is applied in disparate treatment
cases, a finding that age was a determinative factor in the employer's
decision is also a finding of "willfulness" in almost every case. 10 6 This
result occurs for two reasons. First, the ADEA's requirement that cov-
ered employers post notices about the ADEA in their workplaces'
0 7
makes it impossible for an employer to show that he or she did not know
that the ADEA was potentially applicable. ' 08 Second, a finding that age
was a determining factor in the employer's decision makes Thurston's
"good faith" defense unavailable to an employer since one cannot be
found to have intentionally discriminated against an individual employee
in good faith.
This problem does not arise in disparate impact/company policy
cases such as Thurston. In those cases, the factfinder looks at the em-
ployer's decision regarding an employment policy and determines
whether the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard" for the mat-
ter of whether its policy violated the ADEA, or whether, after consider-
ing potential ADEA applicability, the employer decided in good faith
that the policy did not violate the Act. If the policy violates the Act, but
the employer acted in good faith in developing it, a "willful" violation is
unlikely to be found.
Since Thurston, courts have had to resist imposing automatic liqui-
dated damages in disparate treatment cases. The circuit courts of ap-
peals have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways. Most began by
trying to apply the "knew or showed reckless disregard" standard to dis-
parate treatment cases despite the problem.' 0 9 Eventually, courts began
developing inconsistent standards to deal with the problem while trying
to keep Thurston in mind.
In Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co.,1 10 the Third Circuit developed the
most divergent interpretation of Thurston, requiring "some additional
evidence of outrageous conduct" in order to find a "willful" viola-
tion. I I This standard has not gained much of a following outside of the
Third Circuit. Courts and commentators believe that the Thurston deci-
sion precludes an "outrageous conduct" definition or that Dreyer "goes
problems arise when courts attempt to apply Thurston to cases in which discrete employ-
ment decisions are directed at individuals rather than at groups (as was the case with the
union in Thurston).
106. Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1067; Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158
(6th Cir. 1988); Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1549; Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810
F.2d 1094, 1100 (11th Cir. 1987); Dreyer v. Arco Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651, 657 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1988).
108. In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985), the Court recog-
nized the effect of the posting requirement in its analysis of the "in the picture" standard.
Unfortunately, the Court did not realize that its standard would have the same effect in
disparate treatment cases.
109. See Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 557 n.45 (citing decisions from the
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Fifth, Fourth and Eighth Circuits).
110. 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986).




The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is on the other end of the
post-Thurston spectrum. In Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co." ,s the
court decided that the jury's finding of intentional discrimination pre-
cluded a finding of good faith when the proper jury instruction was
given and the defendant admitted knowledge that the ADEA prohibited
such discrimination."14 Although the Eleventh Circuit expressed its
frustration with the Thurston disparate treatment problem,15 it at-
tempted to follow the case. Its position, however, would appear to re-
sult in a "willful" finding almost every time an ADEA violation is
found, 16 thus frustrating the two-tier liability scheme which the Court
sought to maintain in Thurston.' 17
B. The Tenth Circuit's Post-Thurston "Willfulness" Standards
1. Case Law
The Tenth Circuit experienced a metamorphosis in ADEA liqui-
dated damages jurisprudence after Thurston similar to that experienced
by the other circuit courts of appeals, but its metamorphosis was argua-
bly more rapid than that of other courts. 1 8 Initially, it tried to apply
Thurston's "willfulness" standard to all ADEA cases, but it quickly dis-
covered the same disparate treatment application problem encountered
by other courts. In an important opinion in 1988, Cooper v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co., 1 19 the court formulated a standard that has weathered well
and has even been adopted by one circuit court of appeals.' 20
The Tenth Circuit became familiar with Thurston quite quickly. The
first ADEA case the Tenth Circuit encountered after Thurston was EEOC
v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association (Prudential 2), 121 in which
112. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1550 (10th Cir. 1988). See
also Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (11 th Cir. 1987); Com-
ment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28, at 874; Recent Developments, supra note 12,
at 567.
113. 810 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 1100.
115. Id.
116. In Cooper, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Lindsey as having "the practical result of
permitting a willful violation whenever liability is found in a disparate treatment case."
836 F.2d at 1551.
117. Lindsey typifies the amount of judicial resources that are being spent on ADEA
cases as a result of imprecise statutory drafting and incomplete Supreme Court clarifica-
tion. The case began when Dolen Lindsey sued American Cast Iron Co. (ACIPO) for
violating the ADEA by refusing to promote him because of his age. The jury found for
Lindsey, but the trial court granted ACIPO's motion for judgement notwithstanding the
verdict. In the first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court, reinstated the jury
verdict and remanded the case for entry of judgement. On remand, the trial court rein-
stated the jury verdict and awarded Lindsey backpay and injunctive relief, but it denied
liquidated damages. Lindsey appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit again, where the
denial of liquidated damages was reversed. 810 F.2d at 1096.
118. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
119. 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
120. The Sixth Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's Cooper standard in Schrand v. Fed-
eral Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1988).
121. 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) (Prudential 2).
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the court reconsidered its Prudential 1 122 decision in light of Thurston.
On appeal, the EEOC contended that the specific intent instruction
given by the trial judge was too strict. The Tenth Circuit agreed, noting
that the Supreme Court specifically rejected that standard in Thurston. 123
The court set forth the Thurston "knew or showed reckless disregard"
standard, and noted the availability of the "good faith" defense,' 2 4 re-
manding the case for the finder of fact to determine whether there was a
"willful" violation in light of Thurston.12 5
The Tenth Circuit next considered ADEA liquidated damages in
the disparate impact context in EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement System.
12 6
The case was brought by the EEOC on behalf of six individuals, chal-
lenging the validity of Wyoming's retirement statute and seeking to per-
manently enjoin the defendants from enforcing provisions of the
statute. 12 7 The trial judge applied the Central Kansas128 standard and
determined that the defendants were cognizant of the appreciable possi-
bility that the plaintiffs were covered by the ADEA. Since the defend-
ants had relied upon the Wyoming Attorney General's advice that the
statute met ADEA requirements, however, the trial court found that the
violation was not "willful." 1 2 9 The Tenth Circuit applied Thurston's
standard, including the "good faith" defense, and agreed.' 3 0 Wyoming
Retirement is an example of how effectively the Thurston standard works in
disparate impact cases.
After Wyoming Retirement, the Tenth Circuit encountered a number
of disparate treatment ADEA cases. The first was Smith v. Consolidated
Mutual Water Co. 131 Smith contended that Consolidated fired him be-
cause of his age, while Consolidated contended Smith was fired for falsi-
fying water meter tests. 13 2 The parties agreed that the jury would
determine liability, leaving the damages determination, including a de-
termination of the "willfulness" issue, to the court.13 3 The jury found
for Smith, and the court awarded compensatory damages, but did not
find a "willful" violation.' 3 4 On appeal, Smith challenged the "willful-
ness" determination.1
3 5
122. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985).
123. Phudential 2, 763 F.2d at 1174. While the trial court in Prudential I had used the
"specific intent" standard later rejected in Thurston, the Tenth Circuit had used the "in the
picture" standard on appeal, another standard the Supreme Court rejected in Thurston. Id.
at 1174 n.6 (listing the cases upon which the Tenth Circuit had relied in Prudential 1: Cen-
tral Kansas, Mistretta, and fiffy June).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1175.
126. 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 1427.
128. EEOC v. Central Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983). See supra
text accompanying notes 62-66 for a discussion of this standard.
129. Id. at 1431.
130. Id.
131. 787 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1141-42.
133. Id. at 1443.
134. Id. at 1442-43.
135. Id. at 1443.
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The evidence of discrimination was as follows: Smith's supervisor,
twenty years his junior, often referred to Smith as "an old goat." Con-
solidated replaced Smith with a younger worker, and never confronted
Smith about allegedly falsifying meter tests before deciding to discharge
him. All of the employees under Smith's supervisor's direction were
considerably younger than Smith. Smith's final two job performance
evaluations said he had been "knocked around a bit over the years," and
his supervisors criticized him for slowness and an inability to meet
quotas. '
36
The Tenth Circuit upheld the denial of liquidated damages. The
court noted that the "thin nature of the evidence" 13 7 supported the
jury's finding that age was a determinative factor in Consolidated's deci-
sion, 138 but did not support a "willful" violation under Thurston. 139 The
lack of a "willfulness" finding may have been influenced by two factors.
First, the court noted Thurston's rejection of the "appreciable possibil-
ity" standard, perhaps indicating that Smith might have been able to
sustain a "willfulness" finding under that standard.140 Second, the par-
ties stipulated that the court would make the "willfulness" determina-
tion, and there is always the possibility that a jury would have taken the
opposite view.
The next time the Tenth Circuit addressed the ADEA liquidated
damages provision in a disparate treatment context was in Cooper v. As-
plundh Tree Expert Co. 141 In Cooper, the court formulated a new "willful-
ness" standard which would be more applicable to disparate treatment
cases than Thurston had been, but which would maintain the two-tier lia-
bility scheme that the Supreme Court wanted to maintain in Thurston.
The Tenth Circuit wanted to develop a workable standard that the
Supreme Court would uphold on appeal, having had one of its ADEA
liquidated damages determinations vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Thurston just three years prior to Cooper.14 2
In Cooper, foreman Joe Cooper was discharged, allegedly for violat-
ing work rules and for his poor attitude toward management. 143 He
contended that he was fired because of his age. The jury answered spe-
136. Id. at 1442.
137. Id. at 1443.
138. Id. at 1442.
139. Id. at 1443.
140. Id.
141. 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
142. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), va-
cated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985) (Prudential 1). See supra notes 67-73 and accompa-
nying text. In Prudential 1, the Tenth Circuit used the "in the picture" standard in
connection with the ADEA's liquidated damages provision. See supra notes 34-37 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this standard. The Tenth Circuit had also used the "in
the picture" standard in connection with the FLSA's statute of limitations provision, a fact
that did not escape the Court's notice in Thurston. 469 U.S. at 127 (citing EEOC v. Central
Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983)). It was not until McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), however, that the Court specifically rejected the
"in the picture" standard for use with the statute of limitations provision.
143. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1548.
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cial interrogatories, finding Asplundh to have "willfully" violated the
ADEA.1 44 Asplundh challenged the "willful" finding on appeal based
on the standard the jury and district court applied.
14 5
Recognizing that the Third Circuit's Dreyer1 4 6 approach was ex-
treme and inconsistent with both legislative history and the ADEA itself,
and that the Eleventh Circuit in Lindsey 147 followed Thurston but was in-
consistent with the two-tier liability scheme Congress had intended,
148
the Tenth Circuit looked to the Fourth 14 9 and Eighth 150 Circuits for
assistance in fashioning a new standard. Under this new standard, a ba-
sic finding of liability requires that age be at least one of possibly several
"determinative" factors in the employer's conduct, whereas age must be
the "predominant" factor in the employer's decision before a "willful"
violation will be found. 15 1
In developing its "predominant factor" standard, the Tenth Circuit
addressed the difficulty of applying Thurston to disparate treatment
cases.' 5 2 The court later referred to its standard as "an intermediate
approach." 153 The Tenth Circuit's "predominant factor" standard
demonstrates that the court is trying to be sensitive to the dictates of the
Supreme Court by maintaining the two-tier liability scheme of the
ADEA, while at the same time recognizing the difficulties in applying the
Court's standards every day to a variety of fact patterns.
While Cooper was being decided, the Tenth Circuit had two other
ADEA disparate treatment cases under consideration. i54 In the first
case, Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,155 the plaintiff, Craig Anderson,
was an insulator for Phillips and his union's president. Phillips was clos-
ing one of its refineries, and entered into a closure agreement with the
union which set forth the manner in which employees from the closing
refinery would be considered for jobs with other refineries. Two
months later, complaints that Phillips was discriminating on the basis of
age in the transfer procedure prompted Anderson, as union president,
144. Id. at 1546.
145. Id. at 1551-52.
146. Dreyer v. Arco Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
906 (1987). See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
standard.
147. Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (llth Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard.
148. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1550.
149. Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[t]here must be
something more than a retrospective finding by a jury that there was a simple violation of the
statute.") (emphasis added).
150. Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[in order that
the liquidated damages be based on evidence that does not simply duplicate that needed
for the compensatory damages, there must be some additional evidence of the employer's
'reckless disregard.' ") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1551.
152. Id. at 1549.
153. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 636 (10th Cir. 1988).
154. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988); Spulak v. K
Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990). Both cases were briefed and argued prior to
Cooper, but were decided after it. Id. at 1159 n.5.
155. 861 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
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to file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. Anderson withdrew
the charge six weeks later, after Phillips' management and union mem-
bers discussed the charge at meetings.1
56
Eight months later, Anderson filed his own ADEA charge, alleging
that Phillips retaliated against him for filing the first claim by failing to
transfer him to any of the jobs on which he had bid. A jury found that
Phillips had violated the ADEA by retaliating against Anderson and
found that the violation was "willful."1 57 On appeal, Phillips challenged
both the retaliation and the "willfulness" verdicts.
158
The Tenth Circuit upheld the retaliation verdict, but reversed the
"willfulness" finding. As in Smith, the court found the evidence to be
too "thin and circumstantial" to support the "willfulness" finding. 159
The court wanted Anderson to present evidence of "something more
than mere knowledge on the part of the employer of the potential appli-
cability of the ADEA' 16 to support the liquidated damages award, but
Anderson's evidence could not meet that test.
The Tenth Circuit next employed the new Cooper standard in Spulak
v. K Mart Corp. 161 Frank Spulak began working for K Mart Corporation
(K Mart) when he was in his forties. He was an auto service department
manager in early 1985 when K Mart underwent a corporate restructur-
ing, resulting in his assignment to a new district manager, James Price.
In the two months after Price arrived, and before Spulak took an
early retirement from his job, Spulak was given written reprimands for
acts that, up to that time, had been "minor and widespread policy viola-
tions."' 16 2 Ultimately, Spulak took an early retirement, believing that he
would be fired if he did not resign.
Spulak sued K Mart under the ADEA, alleging constructive dis-
charge. K Mart contended that Spulak asked to retire after receiving a
written warning for conduct that he admitted was wrong. 163 The case
156. Id. at 633.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 636-37.
160. Id. at 635-36. The court cites Thurston to support its "something more" require-
ment, but the language is not found in that case. Rather, this requirement comes from
Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987), one of the cases the Cooper
court relied upon to establish its "predominant factor" standard.
161. 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 1159. These policy violations included using the store's back door, failing to
sign in and out properly, and incorrectly invoicing work done on his car. Price in fact
downgraded the violations to written warnings after first threatening to fire Spulak. Id. at
1153. In addition, K Mart referred to "an isolated abstract comment" as the only possible
proof of age discrimination, and asserted that the "thin nature" of that evidence was not
enough to qualify as "willful" under Thurston. Brief of Appellant K Mart Corporation at
41, Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156). Spulak con-
tended that Price's comment about getting "old fogies" out, along with the circumstances
of Spulak's termination, demonstrated that K Mart had not made a good faith effort to
comply with the ADEA. Brief of Appellee Frank L. Spulak at 39, Spulak v. K Mart Corp.,
894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156).
163. Brief of Appellant K Mart Corporation at 39, Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d
1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156).
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
was submitted to the jury, which found for Spulak and awarded him
backpay and liquidated damages for a "willful" violation of the
ADEA.164 K Mart appealed on several grounds, one of which was the
"willful" finding and resulting liquidated damages award. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the liquidated damages award.
16 5
2. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's New Standard
Spulak is important because it was the first case after Cooper in which
the court found a defendant liable for a "willful" violation of the ADEA.
An examination of Anderson, Cooper and Spulak will help attorneys practic-
ing in the Tenth Circuit assess whether their cases support a "willful-
ness" finding. The proof model for ADEA cases must be kept in mind
when analyzing the cases.
166
In Anderson, the evidence of age discrimination was barely sufficient
to support Anderson's retaliation claim. 16 7 Anderson presented evi-
dence that management told him transferjobs might dry up if he did not
withdraw the ADEA claim, and that management treated him differently
after he filed the charge. Although the basic finding of liability survived
on appeal, the abundant evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for Phillips' actions convinced the court that reasonable minds
would not have found retaliation to be the predominant factor in Phillips'
actions, and it reversed the "willfulness" finding. 168 The court pointed
out, for example, that Anderson did not take the qualification test re-
quired for one job, and that another refinery to which Anderson had
applied was undergoing a reduction in force. At that refinery, Phillips
was bound by union contract to fill open positions with re-employables
from within that geographic area.'
6 9
In Cooper, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that age was
a determinative factor in Asplundh's action, but it remanded the case for
reconsideration of the "willfulness" issue under the new standard.
170
The court conceded that the record strongly suggested that Asplundh
supervisors "deliberately set out to find a basis to discharge Cooper,"'
17 1
but "such significant evidence of other possible motives" was present in
the case that the court was not comfortable deciding that the jury would
have found age to be the predominant determinative factor in Cooper's
164. Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1152.
165. Id. at 1159. K Mart also unsuccessfully challenged the trial court's decision to
allow testimony by two former employees concerning the circumstances under which they
left their employment. Id. at 1156. One of the witnesses was informed that Spulak had
taken early retirement at K Mart's request, and was asked if he was going to follow suit. A
few days later he was fired after being reprimanded for minor matters. Two weeks later,
another employee was fired a few months before his pension vested. Both were replaced
with younger workers. Id.
166. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
167. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 636-37 (10th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1552 (emphasis added).





The "other possible motives" referred to by the court included
Cooper's violation of work rules, his alleged poor attitude toward man-
agement and his sub-par work. 173 Asplundh presented undisputed evi-
dence that Cooper violated company policy. He bought food during
work hours, wore spikes while climbing live trees, used personal vehicles
on the job site and did not require his crew to wear hard hats.
17 4
Cooper countered with testimony that Asplundh did not uniformly en-
force the policies and that his crew's work was average or above average
in most areas.175 Although Cooper's evidence was sufficient to support
a basic finding of liability, 176 it was not enough for the court to take the
"willfulness" issue from the jury, given the other possible motives.1 77
In contrast, the Spulak court found K Mart's actions to lack Cooper's
"significant evidence of possible motives" other than age discrimina-
tion.' 7 8 Pointing to the disparity between the minor nature of Spulak's
wrongdoing and the severity of K Mart's response, the remarks indicat-
ing concern with Spulak's age and the similar treatment of other older
workers,179 the court upheld the jury's "willfulness" finding. In addi-
tion, the Spulak court offered a hint as to what sort of evidence would have
qualified as significant evidence of other possible motives for Spulak's
discharge. The court pointed out that while Spulak's discharge came
shortly after a corporate restructuring, K Mart did not argue or offer
evidence that Spulak's profits record was a factor in K Mart's
conduct. 18 0
Anderson and Cooper demonstrate that even some evidence of inten-
tional action on the employer's part will not serve to sustain a "willful-
ness" finding as long as there is conflicting evidence of intention. The
Tenth Circuit's standard provides for a basic liability finding if age is a
"determinative" factor in the employer's decision, and a "willful" find-
ing if age is the predominant determinative factor in the employer's de-
cision. To address this distinction, employees should attempt to put
forward evidence of bad intention on the employer's part, while employ-
ers should attempt to put forward evidence that places the employee's
evidence in doubt. If there is conflicting evidence regarding intention,
the jury will likely be uncomfortable with a "willfulness" finding.
No concrete rule can be synthesized from these cases, but the les-
son to be learned about the Tenth Circuit's approach is fairly, straight-
forward: the key to "willfulness" findings in disparate treatment
contexts is disparate treatment. For employers, this means treating all em-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1548.
174. Id. at 1547.
175. Id. at 1547-48.
176. Id. at 1552.
177. Id.
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ployees uniformly. For an employee, this means proving that he or she
has been treated differently than other employees who are similarly
situated.
In addition, an employer can protect itself by not "helping" the em-
ployee meet his or her prima facie case, because an employee cannot
even reach a "willfulness" determination unless basic liability is found.
This means establishing preventive employment practices and good
records. An employee can likewise benefit from keeping good records,
such as noting changes in discipline for policy violations. As in all cases,
each side must muster all relevant, credible evidence. Finally, an em-
ployer will want to have the "willfulness" determination made by the
court; an employee by a jury, since a layperson's ideas of "determina-
tive" and "predominant" factors are probably more susceptible to per-
suasion than are the court's.
VI. CONCLUSION
A more uniform standard for defining "willful" violations of the
ADEA is needed. The courts, however, will probably be compelled to
accept different standards for ADEA cases involving disparate treatment
and disparate impact. A single uniform standard for both types of cases
will result in automatic liquidated damages assessments in disparate
treatment cases since intent is required for a basic finding of liability.
Although the FLSA "willfulness" standard has this effect, it is very
clearly not what Congress intended for the ADEA.
In a federal enforcement scheme, particularly one regarding dis-
crimination, uniform application is important. Employers and employ-
ees across the country need to know how certain behavior will be
judged. In fairness, employees and prospective employees should be
able to rely on the same degree of protection from discriminatory em-
ployment decisions. In addition, it is important to our federal system
that Congress' true intent be implemented.
The definition of "willfulness" in the ADEA liquidated damages
provision is likely to be addressed again soon by the Supreme Court.
Now that the Court has applied Thurston to both the liquidated damages
and the statute of limitations provisions of the ADEA, the circuit courts
of appeals will want a clearer explanation of Thurston. If the Supreme
Court does not address the ADEA liquidated damages provision again,
perhaps it will look to the Tenth Circuit as it attempts to resolve the
Thurston disparate treatment application problem. The Court may
choose not to address the problem, however, in which case the circuit
courts of appeals will have to continue construing the provision to the
best of their abilities. If the Supreme Court does not address the prob-
lem, employers should lobby the legislature to amend the ADEA so that
they will not be subject in disparate treatment cases to an automatic
doubling of damages by circuit courts of appeals which adhere to the
Court's Thurston holding.
The Tenth Circuit's "predominant determinative factor" provision
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is readily applicable to disparate treatment cases and maintains the
ADEA's two-tier civil liability scheme. It can be applied by courts and, if
necessary, by the legislature in the form of a statutory amendment. In
addition, it is a standard that will generate a clearer jury instruction than
will any of the other post-Thurston standards. 18 The standard will thus
result in more consistent verdicts and, hopefully, fewer appeals.
Diane G. Cluxton-Kremer
181. One practitioner illustrated the manner in which courts are giving Thurston "lip
service" without actually applying it:
The key to obtaining a liquidated damages award is properly instructing the
jury on the definition of willfulness and presenting persuasive evidence of egre-
gious conduct. If the jurors want to punish the defendant, they will most likely
find that the defendant's conduct meets the Supreme Court's definition of willful-
ness, even if they do not understand that definition. An instruction using the
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. or Trans World Airlines v. Thurston language is safest.
Abrahamson, Age Discrimination: A Primer on Proving Damages, 25 TRIAL 26, 30 (1989) (cita-
tions omitted).
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